This paper is an historical study of the strategy, tactics, and weapons employed by Israel, Egypt, and Syria in the battle for air superiority from 1967 through 1973. The study is developed chronologically beginning with the 1967 War, through the War of Attrition, and ending with the cease-fire in the 1973 War. It has been compiled from an extensive review of unclassified, primarily secondary, unofficial sources. The paper concludes that, in a mid-intensity war with modern air forces and air defense forces: 1) The achievement of strategic, tactical, and/or technological surprise can significantly influence the battle for air superiority, 2) Missiles have demonstrated the capability to significantly influence the air superiority battle in surface-to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-ground operations, 3) Air superiority can be achieved over the modern battlefield only by defeating both surface-to-air and air-to-air capabilities of the enemy, 4) The achievement of air superiority over the battle area requires the combined efforts of air and land forces of which long range artillery may be the most effective weapon for the suppression of surface-based air defenses.
